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 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper examines the currency experience of Argentina over the last four decades. Our main 
focus is on the economic, coalitional, and institutional factors that have affected exchange rate 
policies.  In the period considered, Argentina has utilized a variety of exchange rate regimes 
(from a floating to a fixed exchange rate in a dollar-standard currency board), and the evolution 
of both the nominal parity and the real exchange rate also differed significantly.
1 Those regimes 
have coexisted with different strategies of development (from fairly closed, import-substitution 
industrialization, to more open regimes), which included multiple combinations of monetary, 
fiscal, financial, labor, and sectoral policies, generating significant changes in the incentives for 
social coalition building.   And on the political side, in turn, different exchange rate policies 
combined with diverse political and institutional settings, in democratic and authoritarian 
regimes as well.  
The Argentine experience has thus produced a rich set of historical cases and observations for 
hypotheses testing.  In addition to problems of economic consistency and credibility of exchange 
rate policies (see Kiguel 1994; Calvo and Végh, 1998; Corbo and de Melo, 1985; Drazen and 
Helpman, 1986 and Buiter, 1986, among others), we discuss the conditions under which political 
sustainability comes in to play, namely how distributive considerations retain great significance 
even in the presence of economy-wide policies (Diaz-Bonilla, 1989; Frieden, 1991; Perotti, 
1992; Laban and Sturzenegger, 1994a and 1994b and Schamis, 1999) .  In fact, we examine why 
policies that may generate imbalances are implemented in the first place, and why, once 
disequilibrium arises, some policies are chosen instead of other alternatives that are equally 
available. In this sense, we expect to contribute to the literature on the political economy of 
exchange rates, a growing field of inquiry though one mainly limited to the industrialized world 
(for example, Odell, 1982; Gowa, 1983; Destler and Randall Henning, 1989; Frieden, 1994; 
Randall Henning, 1994 and Kirshner, 1995).  A focus on a middle-size, developing economy, 
characterized by weak fiscal accounts, shallow capital markets, vulnerable banking systems, and 
feeble regulatory institutions in the context of inconsistent development strategies, may pose new 
questions to this research field. 
Our analysis proceeds as follows.  In the next section we introduce our main explanatory 
argument.  We distinguish three main periods in line with the behavior of the nominal exchange 
rate: periodic adjustments in the peg until the mid-1970s, accelerated devaluations through the 
1980s, and stability since the beginning of the 1990s.  These periods coincide with different 
strategies of development in a broad sense, which have subjected exchange rate management to 
different macroeconomic constraints, changing incentives for coalition building, and volatile 
politico-institutional settings.  On this basis, we analyze each of these periods with some 
historical detail in section three.  In section four, we develop different tests of the hypotheses 
suggested by the narrative of the previous section.  Section five presents the main conclusions. 
                                                  
1 In what follows, the nominal exchange rate is defined in domestic currency per unit of foreign currency 
(basically the US dollar).  Therefore the terms devaluation, depreciation or weak currency (revaluation, appreciation or 
strong currency) mean an increase (decrease) in the amount of domestic money paid for one unit of foreign currency.  
The real exchange rate is defined as the ratio of the price of tradables to non tradables.  Therefore the terms 
devaluation or depreciation of the RER (revaluation or appreciation) mean an increase (decrease) in that ratio. II. EXCHANGE RATE POLICIES AND CRISES: AN INTERPRETATION 
 
The starting point is the dual role of the exchange rate, which includes both the nominal aspects 
related to the short-run management of aggregate demand and the real aspects affecting 
aggregate supply in the longer-run. This dual role is reflected in the two approaches that have 
been usually considered to define the proper exchange rate policy.  One is the “real exchange 
rate” approach, which emphasizes the distinction between tradable and non-tradable goods, and 
the effect of the exchange rate on external competitiveness and the trade account (Balassa, 1977; 
1985).  The other is the “nominal anchor” approach, which highlights the role of the exchange 
rate in the inflationary process and its relationship with monetary aggregates, interest rates, 
capital flows, and the functioning of the financial system.  This dual role is at the core of many 
problems of inconsistency in macroeconomic programs (see discussions in Corden, 1990; 
Williamson, 1991), but it also highlights the distributional consequences of different exchange 
rate policies.  
For instance, producers of tradables generally prefer a devalued exchange rate (depending on the 
import content of their products), while producers of non-tradables may benefit from a strong 
currency.  Debtors in domestic currency may be helped by devaluations that increase inflation 
and reduce the real cost of servicing their debt; a situation which reverses if, as in many Latin 
American countries in the recent past, their liabilities are in foreign currency.  In terms of the 
exchange rate regime, financiers and foreign investors would favor exchange rate stability and 
credible nominal anchors.  Producers and workers, in turn, may prefer a more flexible exchange 
rate if this allows the economy to absorb external shocks with less disruption of real activity.   
The dual role of the exchange rate must be seen in the context of the “historical political 
economy”  (for the term, see Maier, 1987) of Argentina in the postwar period.  We start with Di 
Tella=s (1987) observation about the existence of a pattern in Argentina’s exchange rate policies: 
a cycle with two phases which he calls the “repressed stage,” during which some key prices are 
controlled to tame inflation, and a subsequent “loosening stage,” when those controls collapse 
and inflation jumps to new levels.  The “repressed stages” are usually associated with fixed 
exchange rates or managed crawling pegs, which, because of inconsistencies with other 
macroeconomic policies and distortions in relative prices, generate disequilibria that are not 
sustainable.  When that happens, the exchange rate regime changes abruptly (usually along with 
the minister of finance).  The “loosening stage,” in turn, is a period of far higher inflation in 
which exchange rate regimes switch to different types of floating and, in several instances, 
multiple exchange rates (see Charts 1, 2 and 3, with the behavior of the (log of the) nominal 
exchange rate). 
As useful Di Tella’s cycles are as a descriptive device for Argentina=s economic history, a 
thorough explanation of the factors that generated the cycles was not fully developed.  Moreover, 
the dynamics of the cycles themselves were changing: by the 1980s, in fact, they had become 
shorter and more violent, and finally reached hyper-inflationary levels in 1989-1990.  However, 
since 1991, when Congress passed the Convertibility Law, pegging the peso one-to-one to the 
dollar, the cycles seemed to have stopped.  Argentina’s performance has been in line with 
exchange-rate-based stabilization programs: the initial increase in domestic absorption, the 
progressive decline in inflation, and the deterioration of the real exchange rate and external accounts.  The “loosening” stage, however, has not taken place.
2   
In trying to explain, first, why the cycles have become shorter and more violent and, second, why 
they have subsequently receded, we borrow the argument about cycles of repression and 
loosening.  However, we modify and extend the analysis, considering the interaction of the 
exchange rate regime, the broader macroeconomic and development strategies, and the political 
and institutional settings.   In contrast to Di Tella, we distinguish three types of cycles of 
repression-loosening (see Charts 1, 2 and 3).  The first type of cycle corresponds to the politics of 
redistribution under classic import-substitution industrialization (ISI).  This phase shows 
periodic, step-wise adjustments in the nominal exchange rate (Chart 2). Those discrete 
adjustments reflect the redistribution struggle around the agrarian surplus toward manufacture, 
with controls in the capital account.  This period goes from the 1950’s to the mid-1970’s, and it 
ends with the military coup d’etat of March 1976.  
The second phase opens with the 1976 military regime, but continues through the civilian 
government of the Union Civica Radical (1983-1989) with the Alfonsín Administration and also 
includes the first 18-20 months of the Menem administration, elected in 1989.  This second 
period is characterized by increasingly large devaluations and accelerating inflation, until 
reaching hyperinflationary proportions in 1989-1990.   The large jump in inflation reflects how 
the politics of redistribution began to be played at the level of a fiscally constrained public 
sector. Neither the military regimes (1976-1983) nor the Alfonsín Administration (1984-1989) 
were able or willing to control the distributive struggle that was affecting the public budget (and 
economic management of the civilian government was further affected by very negative 
international economic conditions).  With the elimination of controls in the capital account, this 
setting led to exchange rate crises linked to persistent fiscal imbalances, along the lines described 
by Krugman (1979) and extended by Calvo (1996).  
In the third period, since the early 1990s, the politics of redistribution turns into the politics of 
(hyper)inflation, in response of which a broad coalition favoring stability emerges. This political 
support allowed the implementation of an important institutional innovation: the currency board 
created by the Convertibility Plan of March 1991, during the Menem Administration, which 
established a fixed exchange rate for the peso (at a one-to-one parity with the dollar).  This 
institutional innovation eliminated all discretionary power in the management of the exchange 
rate while substantially limiting the use of passive monetary policies to accommodate 
distributional conflicts.  Those conflicts also appeared to have become more muted, in part 
because supporting international conditions and domestic growth created the conditions for side 
payments to some of the affected groups.  As a result, and in contrast to the previous two periods, 
the third one is remarkably stable in exchange rate and price levels (see Charts 1, 3 and 5).   
While the previous discussion was conducted in terms of the nominal exchange rate, Chart 4 
shows the real exchange rate for exports (REREX),
3 along with the world real price of 
                                                  
2 The boom-bust nature of the exchange-rate-based stabilization programs is a documented fact: while they 
usually begin with a consumption boom, they normally end up with a recession. Therefore for countries suffering from 
high inflation it is a matter of "recession now or recession later" (see for instance, Kiguel and Liviatan, 1992; and 
Hoffmaister and Végh, 1996).  A thorough revision of this literature can be found in Calvo and Végh, 1998.  
3 REREX is defined as PREX*(1-TE)/PD; i.e., the price deflator of exports (PREX) from national accounts, 
adjusted by export taxes (TE) divided by the price deflator of the domestic non-traded good (PD), calculated from 
national accounts.  Similarly, RERIM (not shown in the Chart) is equal to PRIM*(1+TM)/PD, where PRIM is the 
price deflator of imports from national accounts, adjusted by import taxes (TM).  See Devarajan, Lewis, and agricultural products, the main component of Argentina’s total exports.  In general, it appears 
that the behavior of the RER in Argentina, when not affected by world conditions, is the by-
product of policies linked to the management of inflation, where the exchange rate is utilized 
usually as a monetary anchor.  Thus, although the evolution of the real exchange rate is also 
discussed, we develop our argument below mainly in terms of behavior of the nominal exchange 
rate.  
III. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
III.1 THE POLITICS OF REDISTRIBUTION IN THE CLASSICAL PERIOD OF 
IMPORT SUBSTITUTION 
 
Despite great political instability, this period shows remarkable continuity in the application of 
the general policies associated with an ISI strategy.  Three democratically-elected governments, 
three military regimes, and one civilian (but military-controlled) administration maintained 
closed trade regimes and controls on capital movements (see Tables 1 and 2).  In a context of 
great instability, with alternating civilian and military governments, this phase also included 
periods of open, armed conflict between different factions of the military, such as in 1962 -63.  
The Peronist Party, ousted from office in 1955, was banned from participating in elections during 
the next two decades, introducing a high degree of instability in the political process.        
The exchange rate moved in steps (see Chart 2 for an amplification of the period), with periods 
of more or less stability followed by upward adjustments. Table 2 shows the different exchange 
rate regimes and policies since the end of the 1950’s.  The step-wise adjustments in the nominal 
exchange rate were associated with the internal economic limits of the inward-oriented 
industrialization strategy and its built-in distributional conflict.  The strategy was based on the 
redistribution of the agrarian surplus generated by the fertile Pampas, toward industrialization 
and an expanding State sector, which benefited workers and urban middle classes.  
Consequently, ISI=s political support was based on the mostly urban alliance among 
industrialists, wage-earners, and public sector contractors and employees.   
The exchange rate regime was usually one of fixed (but adjustable) rates to try to maintain lower 
levels of inflation and support the process of industrialization.  The import-substitution strategy 
could be pursued, at least initially, with fixed exchange rates because of high trade protection 
shielded the domestic industry from external competition, even in the face of the usual 
appreciation of the real exchange rate.  In addition, a fixed parity helped steady the price of 
imported inputs and capital goods not internally produced, needed for the ISI.  Also, as noticed 
by Braun and Joy (1967) and Díaz-Alejandro (1965), given that Argentina’s exports are mainly 
food products (or “wage goods” in Ricardian terminology) a devaluation would put pressure on 
industrial wages.
4  Therefore, for industrialists and urban workers, a fixed exchange rate was 
perceived as the preferred alternative.  Furthermore, the private sector linked to the state as 
suppliers and public sector enterprises, were inward oriented as well, and did not need an 
                                                                                                                                                                
Robinson, 1993 for a general discussion on this issue. 
4 This is a clear difference with other countries in Latin America. For instance, in Colombia and Brazil 
agricultural exports were not "wage goods" and therefore the trade off between keeping a competitive exchange 
rate and industrialization did not occur. externally competitive RER for their operation.   
The export-oriented agricultural sector, in contrast, preferred a competitive exchange rate.  The 
periodic overvaluation of the real exchange rate caused by the fixed nominal parity and the 
general bias of economic policy toward the protection of industry acted as an important 
disincentive for agriculture (see Díaz-Alejandro, 1970; Little, I., Scitovsky, T. and Scott, M., 
1970 and Balassa et al., 1971).
5 
The economic limits of the ISI strategy would recurrently emerge in full, leading to periodic 
balance of payment crises and sharp devaluations.  The stop-go nature of ISI, and, therefore, the 
cycles of repression and loosening in the exchange rate regime, resulted in good measure from 
the endogenous limits of the economic model. The acceleration of the economy usually led to 
fewer exports (because a larger percentage of the wage goods were consumed internally due to 
growing incomes) and more imported inputs and capital goods (demanded by the expanding 
industry), generating balance of payment crises when official external reserves reached very low 
levels.  At times, the limits inherent in the development strategy were tightened by external 
shocks, and then those crises occurred even though the economy was not expanding rapidly.  In 
any case, given a context of capital controls, exchange rate crises during most of this period 
developed relatively slowly, following the decline in reserves caused by the gradual deterioration 
of the trade balance, and reinforced by the over-invoicing of imports and the under-invoicing of 
exports.   
But there was also a political limit, set by the distributive dispute over domestic income between 
industrialists and workers.  Usually during democratic, and particularly Peronist, governments, 
the influence of labor increased, leading to higher wages (see Charts 8 and  9).  Frequently, this 
took place in the context of accommodating monetary policies, which fueled inflation and 
created the conditions for the recurrence of balance of payment crises.   When the inherent limits 
of the development strategy converged with growing  wage pressures from labor unions and 
expanded distributional conflict over economic resources, important sectors of the industrialists 
and part of the middle classes with private sector employments, tended to abandon the original 
ISI coalition, and sided with agrarian interests and the military in the coming coup against the 
civilian government.  High levels of inflation, international reserves insufficient to sustain 
normal levels of imports and service the external debt, social unrest, and the need to “reestablish 
order” were the reasons generally utilized to try to justify the military coup against a civilian 
government accused of being too corrupt or too weak to control the economic and social crisis.  
The return of Peronism to power in 1973 closed a political cycle of almost two decades since its 
proscription after the 1955 military coup.  In economic terms the 1973 program represented the 
culmination of the ISI strategy of development.  It established a fixed exchange rate, while at the 
same time instituted price controls, increased wages and salaries, and implemented different 
expansionary fiscal and monetary policies to foster industry, employment and growth.   
By mid-1974 economic and political trends began to deteriorate.  After the death of Juan Peron 
                                                  
5
 Relatively high prices for cereals and beef during the fifties (as a result of the Korean War) and during the 
seventies (linked to worldwide expansionary Keynesian policies and the oil crisis), alleviated the impact of an 
overvalued currency (see Chart 4).  It should also be noticed that there were different agricultural groups in Argentina 
during the sixties and seventies more oriented toward the domestic market (sugar, fruits and vegetables, some 
subtropical products like cotton, tobacco, "yerba mate," etc.), for whom the economic incentives were not that different 
from the urban-industrial complex.  in July 1974, his wife, Isabel Peron, as elected Vice-president, replaced her husband.  The 
exchange rate peg continued during the third quarter of 1974.  By 1975, however, the terms of 
trade had declined significantly and the economy entered in recession.  The government tried to 
rekindle economic growth through stimulative fiscal and monetary policies, but this only fueled 
inflation, which made the real exchange rate decline even further.  The deterioration of the 
external accounts forced sharp adjustments of the exchange rate in the last quarter of 1974, and, 
particularly, during the second quarter of 1975. This last episode, known as Ael Rodrigazo” (after 
the then Minister of the Economy, Celestino Rodrigo), was the first of a series of maxi-
devaluations which began to affect the behavior of economic agents.  
Against a backdrop of deteriorating economic conditions, great political uncertainty and 
escalating violence among guerrilla groups, paramilitary operators, and the armed forces, Isabel 
Peron was toppled by a military coup, in March 1976.  From then onwards there was a steady 
decline in the participation in industry in GDP, as well as a fall in real wages.  The whole 
experience probably reinforced in the minds of workers and lower middle classes that the 
Peronist Party was associated with high salaries and a sense of political recognition, while the 
opposite occurred when that Party was ousted by the military.   On the other hand, for agrarian 
and financial groups, and the business community in general, the perception was one of 
economic mismanagement and a clear decline in their share of national income.  The military 
coup of 1976 reflected basically these concerns.   III.2 INFLATION, INDEBTEDNESS AND THE SHIFTING DEVELOPMENT 
PARADIGM 
 
(a) The military regime, 1976-1983 
 
• The Initial Program  
 
After taking power in March 1976, the military regime followed economic policies broadly in 
line with previous governments of the armed forces: it was pro-agriculture, anti-labor and 
suspicious of industrialists who had been allied with the Peronists.  However, once in 
government it was ruthless in repressing workers and political dissidents.  It also dismantled part 
of the consumer-oriented industries, mainly because, for military leaders and their civilian allies, 
the origins of Argentina=s crises had to be traced to the political distortions associated with the 
ISI strategy.  It allowed inefficient domestic industrial firms to develop hand in hand with 
government-protected unions, leading to ever-increasing demands on national resources, and 
even to proposals, as in Chile, to establish complete state control of productive resources 
(Canitrot, 1979; Schamis, 1991).
6  Therefore, the economic policies of the 1976 military regime, 
castigated the manufacturing sector on three different fronts: open trade, currency appreciation, 
and high interest rates.  The industrial sector as a whole lost about 10 points of participation in 
the GDP during 1976-1981, the urban-based coalition of the ISI was significantly weakened, and 
agrarian and financial groups recovered the centrality they had lost as a consequence of the 
1930s crisis.    
This thrust was clear since the initial economic package of April 1976, which included 
devaluation of the Peso, trade liberalization measures, elimination of the “nationalization of 
deposits” (a system of 100% reserves for the banking system and credit allocation and control by 
the Central Bank, instituted during the Peronist government), and elimination of price controls.  
Also, the military government abolished the existing system of negotiations between 
representatives of entrepreneurs and unions to determine wages and salaries, the unions were 
placed under the control of the Ministry of Labor and wages were set by the government.   
Increased prices for agricultural products and freer prices for other goods, on the one hand, and 
controlled wages, on the other, led to a decline of real wages, which in 1976-1977 stood at 60% 
the level reached in 1974-1975, while the ratio of agricultural to non-agricultural goods increased 
20%.   
The financial system, which had been under heavy control during the Peronist government’s 
system of “nationalization of deposits,” benefited as well from the new policies. In addition to 
the 1976 measures, by mid-1977 the government implemented a financial reform that 
deregulated the banking industry.  Subsidized credit, central to the whole ISI experiment, came 
to an end.  The financial system expanded substantially during those years, but this growth 
included an important number of fragile financial intermediaries that were unable to withstand 
the shocks that came in the next years.  Also escalating uncertainty, associated with the 
                                                  
6 At the time, all three countries in the Southern Cone (Argentina, Chile and Uruguay) had military 
governments in office, an indication of the deep political crises these societies had experienced at the beginning of 
the seventies.   acceleration of inflation led to growing dollarization (Claassen and De la Cruz Martinez, 1994). 
Although, as argued above, the economic environment generated by the military regime was very 
harsh on important sections of the inward oriented manufacturing sector, the armed forces, 
supported different heavy industries, linked in part to the military complex through a generous 
regime of tax incentives.   Support to these industries was based, in part, on different hypotheses 
of conflict (with Chile and Brazil, and eventually the United Kingdom, over the Malvinas 
Islands), which required  an industrial base for military purposes.  Security reasons were also 
partially behind a program of fiscal incentives for industries in some poor and underpopulated 
provinces, reflecting the armed forces= concerns regarding the security of the frontiers in those 
areas.  Besides the distorted development pattern, the system of industrial incentives represented 
a heavy burden on the national budget (World Bank, 1988). 
Outlays linked directly or indirectly to military operations and programs contributed to fiscal 
imbalances (Chart 11), and those large fiscal deficits were behind levels of inflation for the 
whole period that remained well above the historical averages (only surpassed by the inflationary 
explosions of 1975-76) (Chart 5).  In addition, because inflation remained high, the Olivera-
Tanzi effect (i.e. the losses in revenues in non-indexed tax systems due to lags in collection when 
prices are increasing rapidly) worked against the possibility of placing fiscal accounts under 
control.   
High inflation was a permanent cause of vexation for the economic team of the military 
government.  Besides the economic inefficiencies and waste of resources generated by high 
inflation, it was also eroding whatever legitimacy the regime may have had in front of the public. 
After all, the need to control inflation had been one of the main reasons to justify the 1976 coup 
d’etat, along with the chaotic political and social situation. Yet, by the end of 1978, inflation 
continued unabated at about 150% per year and the economy was in the midst of a recession.  
The failure to achieve the main objective of non-inflationary growth that the military government 
had set for itself, fueled the search for new approaches. This came in the form of the economic 
package of December 1978. 
• The 1978 Program 
 
The new program aimed at breaking inflationary expectations and reducing uncertainties through 
the pre-announcement of three main variables which were controlled by the government: the 
devaluation rate (the schedule indicating the rate of devaluation was known as the “tablita”), the 
prices of goods and services provided by public enterprises and minimum wages.  Of those pre-
announced variables, the exchange rate came to receive the greatest attention and had the 
strongest impact on the economy during the following years until the scheme was abandoned in 
1981. The exchange rate was pre-established in advance for the next 8 months.  When that period 
was about to expire, the rate for the subsequent period was established according to the desired 
goal of inflation for the next period.  Domestic inflation was supposed to converge to 
international inflation adjusted by the preset ratio of devaluation. 
Another component of the economic program was the modification of controls on international 
capital flows, which had been maintained by the financial reform of mid-1977 in an attempt to 
fend off destabilizing capital inflows.  With the December 1978 program those controls were 
lifted, hoping that domestic interest rates, which were deemed too high, would come down to 
lower levels, defined by world interest rates adjusted by country risk and the rate of devaluation.  In addition to the expected economic benefits, the liberalization of capital accounts also opened 
more business opportunities for a growing financial system.  
This important change can be seen in the totally different relationship between broad money and 
international reserves before and after 1978 (Chart 12).  While with capital controls the 
governments could maintain ratios of 10-25 units of domestic money per unit of international 
reserves, after the opening up of the capital account, the markets appear to have forced a very 
specific ratio (about 3 to 1) between these two variables, generating exchange rate crises every 
time the ratio increased over that value.    
Also, the December 1978 program included reductions of the financing of Provinces and public 
enterprises through the national budget, and the gap was covered by increased domestic and 
international borrowing on the part of the public sector at all levels.  By 1981, total external debt 
had undergone an almost threefold increase since 1978, from 13.3 billion dollars to 35.7 billion 
dollars (see Chart 7). The liberalization of foreign borrowing created the temporary illusion of a 
fiscal bonanza.  The military saw in it an opportunity to launch grand projects (nuclear plants, 
missiles) and modernize its equipment.  Over time, defense expenditures grew disproportionately 
vis-a-vis other items, including public enterprises in the heavy industry sectors linked to the 
military complex.   
The pre-announced rate of devaluation was set at levels below the rate of inflation, and the 
process of exchange rate appreciation -that was already under way-, accelerated substantially 
after 1978.  In 1979 the current account turned negative after three years of positive figures 
(although the trade balance still showed a surplus). But, in 1980 and in 1981 the trade balance 
also shifted to a deficit.   
The crisis of balance of payments was deep enough to cast doubts about the sustainability of the 
predetermined exchange rate.  Additional private capital inflows almost came to a halt on 
expectations of future devaluations far above the predetermined “tablita.”  They were also due to 
higher interest rates in the US (from 15% in 1980 to almost 19% in 1981).  In February 1981, the 
government devalued the peso by 10%, followed by devaluations in April and June of over 20% 
each, the last two under a new military regime.  
These devaluations exacerbated the existing problems in the real economy and led to the collapse 
of several important banks and financial institutions.  Attempts by the government at rescuing the 
banking sector led to a large quasi-fiscal deficit.  Inflation, which had declined to close to 100% 
a year in 1979-1980, jumped back up to about 170% in 1981.  Before and after those changes, 
the government borrowed in international markets to defend the value of the local currency, and 
when this was no longer possible, it absorbed, under pressure from the international banks and 
local groups, an important share of the private external debt.  The public sector was thus saddled 
with a substantial debt burden (see Chart 7).   
The Malvinas war in 1982 (which took place under a different military ruler, the third in this 
military regime), added to the fiscal problems and general uncertainty.   Between 1981-1983 
fiscal deficits ranged between 12% and almost 14% (figures not far from the record of almost 
15% set in 1975 by the previous Peronist government, one of the arguments for the military coup 
of 1976).  When the international markets dried up also for public borrowers after the “Mexican 
crisis” of August 1982, the economy sank into recession with high levels of inflation.  
• Conclusion  
From the point of view of economic analysis, the pattern of exchange rate crises is easily 
explained by the inconsistency between the exchange rate regime, utilized as nominal anchor to 
tame inflation, and the persistent fiscal deficit with a liberalized capital account.
7  But from a 
political economy perspective the main question is why such inconsistent policies were pursued, 
and the failures of previous attempts disregarded.  We argue that they can be better understood as 
the result of conflicting forces and interests.  First, there was the political need to control 
inflation, which, as argued before, had been, along with restoring order, one of the military 
regime’s main justifications for intervention in 1976.  Next, the Armed Forces wanted to 
maintain and develop an industrial base for defense, and it converged with the interests of 
industry and protected heavy industries.  These actions added to fiscal deficits and economic 
inefficiencies.  Finally, the financial community preferred an open capital account and stability in 
the exchange rate.  The military regime=s legacy includes weak fiscal accounts, mounting external 
debt, a distorted development pattern, and a fragile financial system, which created important 
constraints to the economic management (including exchange rate policies) for the next civilian 
governments.  
(b) The Return to Democracy   
 
After defeating the Peronist candidate by a solid margin in a free election, the Alfonsín 
government took office in the midst of great expectations.  Alfonsín was able to paint the 
Peronist Party as the continuation of the despised military and handed the Peronists their first 
electoral defeat ever.  The Alfonsín Administration’s initial economic policies appear to have 
been based on two premises.  First, wages needed an upward correction.  Second, his 
Administration was going to get better treatment from creditor countries on Argentina’s external 
debt.  It had been contracted by the military (in part to finance the armed crisis with Chile and the 
Malvinas war), and there seemed to be some doubts as to its real amount and even its legitimacy 
(particularly the private debt that had been absorbed by the public sector with Dagnino Pastore as 
Minister of the Economy and Domingo Cavallo as President of the Central Bank).   
Wages, which had already recovered somewhat in 1983 under the military regime, were raised 
further by the Radical Administration in 1984, almost reaching the 1974 peak in real terms 
(Chart 8).  Although the fiscal deficit was somewhat reduced, it still stood in double figures.  
Also the economic team tried to maintain a competitive exchange rate, an approach that some of 
them had applied with success in the previous Radical government during the 1960’s, in a very 
different economic environment. These expansionary policies, led to an acceleration in inflation, 
which reached over 600% in 1984 and 1985.  The Minister of the Economy was changed in early 
1985. 
In June 1985, the new economic authorities unveiled the Austral Plan, which included a fixed 
exchange rate, along with several fiscal and monetary adjustments to control inflation.  The 
deficit was brought down from about 12% in 1984 to the 5-6% range the next 3 years (Chart 11). 
 Inflation also declined to below 90% per year in 1986, the first time it declined to double digits 
                                                  
7 The question of "what went wrong" with the stabilization and liberalization programs of the Southern Cone is 
discussed in particular Edwards, 1984; Balassa 1985; Corbo and de Melo, 1987; and the special issues of World 
Development, 1985 edited by Corbo and de Melo and Economic Development and Cultural Change, 1986 edited by 
Edwards and Teitel.   since 1980 (Chart 5).  Although the advances in fiscal and monetary discipline and inflation 
reduction were important, compared to previous years, they did not get far enough to get 
macroeconomic imbalances under control.  Eventually, the exchange rate had to be readjusted 
after 3 quarters from the initial peg, and then it was changed periodically, until the Primavera 
Plan in August 1988, when there was a brief attempt to fix the exchange rate again. 
At the beginning, the Austral Plan had an important political impact in the 1985 Congressional 
election.  The traditional effect of stabilization plans which utilize the exchange rate as anchors, 
leading to a consumption  boom and sharp declines in inflation (see Calvo and Végh, 1998), 
kicked in just in time.  Improved economic conditions contributed significantly to the Radical 
Party=s victory in 1985, consolidating their position in Congress.  However, this economic and 
political effect proved short-lived.  First, the exchange-rate-based stabilization plan moved from 
the “boom” to the “bust” phase (see footnote 2).  Second, in 1986 there was an important 
collapse of commodity prices worldwide, which, linked to the fact that the Alfonsín 
Administration had not obtained the hoped-for relief from the external debt,
8 maintained the 
external accounts and the public budget under pressure.  Third, under the influence of the 
electoral victory, the Alfonsín Administration began to flirt with the idea of creating a AThird 
Historical Movement,@
9 which would absorb part of the Peronist Party into a new and dominant 
political coalition.   
The results of these attempts at capturing part of the Peronist Party=s electoral base were, on the 
economic front, more difficulties to control the fiscal and monetary variables (to the extent that it 
made more difficult to adjust salaries or privatize public enterprises).  On the political side, the 
Peronist Party stepped up their political opposition, particularly through the largely Peronist 
workers unions, which staged a record of 580 strikes in 1986.   
By 1987, the economic conditions had deteriorated markedly.  Congressional and Provincial 
elections in that year resulted in a big defeat for the Radical Party, and represented a turning 
point in their ability to govern.  The Primavera Plan in August 1988, which also had an important 
political component related to the 1989 presidential elections (see Stein and Streb, 1998), was 
the last attempt to try to control macroeconomic variables.  But the Alfonsín Government 
appeared unwilling (because of its view of what the adequate development strategy should be) or 
unable (given its political weakness after the defeat in the 1987 elections) to take a drastic 
approach at solving the tug-of-war over fiscal resources. 
While in the past, the inability to solve the distributional conflict led the Peronist Party to print 
money, and the military regime to contract external debt, the Radical Administration, with 
reduced access to external borrowing and high inflation that constrained monetary creation, 
resorted to pile up short term domestic debt.   The objective was to buy some time to keep the 
exchange rate and prices under control, until the presidential elections of 1989.  Domestic debt 
jumped from around 7% of GDP in 1986 to about 15% in the first half of 1989 (IMF, Recent 
Economic Developments, November 1990).  Because of the accumulation of the internal debt 
and higher international interest rates, public sector’s interest payments in constant pesos more 
than doubled between 1984 and 1989 (IMF, Recent Economic Developments, 1998).  
                                                  
8 The possibility of reducing the burden of the external debt had to wait until the Brady Plan was launched in 
1989 (with the Alfonsín Administration already nearing the end of its term). 
9 The first two being those led by Hipolito Yrigoyen (also a member of the Radical party) at the beginning of 
the century and Juan Peron since the late 1940's.  The Primavera Program collapsed, leading later to the mid-1989 hyperinflation, with the 
Alfonsín Administration already leaving the government and the candidate of the Radical Party 
defeated in the May 1989 Presidential election.  The transition between the outgoing and the 
incoming administrations, the first between two civilian, democratically elected governments 
from different parties since the 1920’s, was marred by great uncertainty. The accumulated 
imbalances of the Radical government, along with doubts about the economic policies of the new 
government, led to the 1989 hyperinflation,
10 street riots, and assaults to supermarkets.  Chaotic 
social conditions forced President Alfonsín to transfer government well before the originally 
scheduled change of Administrations.   
As in the case of the military regime, it is easy to pinpoint the problems of the economic strategy: 
the initial approach of targeting the real exchange rate and increasing salaries led inevitably to 
high inflation; later, trying to control inflation by fixing the exchange rate with persistent fiscal 
deficits and accumulation of short-term domestic debt created the conditions for explosive 
exchange rate crises and hyperinflation. Again, the key question is why those policies were 
followed at all.  And the answer is probably that  the Alfonsín Administration was never able to 
solve the dilemma between trying to strengthen the political position of the Radical Party (which 
required to capture part of the Peronist voters) and to implement the difficult economic decisions 
aimed at controlling fiscal accounts (which would have most certainly alienated some of those 
same groups). Only after the hyperinflationary experience, the foundations for a broad-based 
coalition in support of the needed economic changes emerged.      
                                                  
10 The quarterly rate of devaluation was 816% in the second quarter, with the Alfonsín Administration, and 
almost 370% in the third quarter, already with the Menem Administration.   III.3 FROM HYPERINFLATION TO STABILITY  
 
(a) Introduction  
 
Although the initial economic programs implemented by the Menem Administration ended up in 
economic turbulence,
11 they established the foundations for the period of stability that began in 
1991.  The halting efforts at opening up the economy, controlling fiscal deficits, privatizing 
public enterprises and deregulating markets, that were initiated and abandoned since the second 
half of the seventies, began to be pursued more firmly since 1989, and those policies were finally 
implemented in full since 1991.  
The cornerstone of the anti-inflationary program was the exchange rate policy, as defined in the 
“Convertibility Law” passed by Congress in March 1991.  This plan pegged the peso to the dollar 
one-to-one, and transformed the monetary and exchange rate functions of the Central Bank into a 
currency board.
12   The Law directed the Central Bank to maintain liquid international reserves to 
cover (almost) 100% of the monetary base.  As a consequence, the monetary authorities could 
not increase this aggregate except when international reserves expanded (through trade surplus or 
net capital inflows).
13    
Since then, the exchange rate has remained fixed for 30 quarters (as of when this paper was 
written, March 1999), by far the longest period of exchange rate stability in half a century.
14  The 
fixed exchange rate has survived the so called “tequila effect” in 1994-1995, a Presidential 
election in 1995, and it is still holding in spite of the financial crises in Asia, Russia and Brazil.  
Di Tella=s cycles of Arepression@ and Aloosening@ appear to have ended. 
In what follows the economic and political reasons for the sustainability of the current exchange 
rate arrangement are discussed. The main considerations include the emergence of a broad-based 
coalition for stability, linked to the memories of hyperinflation, the legal/institutional framework 
of the Convertibility Law, and the way that distributive disputes over factor returns (capital and 
labor), sectoral incomes (agriculture versus industry), and/or fiscal resources (all of which were 
key elements behind major devaluations in the past) evolved.  Additionally, higher economic 
growth, which was the product of better economic policies and more supportive international 
                                                  
11  The pattern of short-lived programs, which attempted to fix the exchange rate only to end in an inflationary 
explosion, continued during the first 18 months of the Menem Administration.  In addition of the shared hyperinflation 
of 1989, the Argentine economy under President Menem had two other similar episodes, one of full hyperinflation in 
1990 (quarterly inflation of 334% and devaluation of 267%) and another of very high inflation in the first quarter of 
1991 (quarterly inflation of 39% and devaluation of 60%).   
12 The original promoter of the idea of a currency board appears to have been Juan Llach, who accompanied 
Cavallo as Undersecretary of Economic Policy, and not Cavallo himself.  Certainly, nothing in his previous writings 
suggested that Cavallo would opt for a policy of fixed exchange rates after having made his name in the profession, 
mainly writing about the problems of such regimes and of overvalued exchange rates in Argentine history (see Cavallo 
and Mundlak, 1982; and Cavallo and Domenech, 1988). 
13 The Convertibility Law did not establish special requirements concerning broader monetary aggregates and 
foreign reserves.  The supply of liquidity beyond the monetary base depends on monetary instruments that the 
Central Bank still controls such as the possibility of changing the reserve requirements for the banking system and 
the use of short term swaps.  This allowed some room of maneuver for monetary policy. 
14 The previous record of exchange rate stability went from 1940 to 1946. conditions,  reduced the salience of distributive conflicts, and allowed some compensations for 
the losers from a fixed exchange rate, at least initially.    
(b) The politics of Argentina’s fixed exchange rate regime  
 
• Legal/Institutional Aspects 
 
The fixed parity was established in the Convertibility Law sanctioned by Congress in March 
1991, which meant that changing the nominal value of the exchange rate required an act of the 
Legislature.  At the same time, the Law mandated full convertibility between domestic and 
foreign currency.  Therefore a Minister who wants to devalue must face two equally complicated 
options.  One alternative is to ask Congress to sanction the new parity, but this risks the loss of 
reserves in seconds while the parliamentary debate takes place.  The other option is to stop 
exchanging dollars for pesos (perhaps through a banking holiday while Congress is deliberating), 
but in this case the official responsible for the decision faces the possibility of legal challenges 
because the Convertibility Law indicates the obligation to exchange dollars and pesos at the 
established parity.  As a consequence, this institutional device has made very difficult (or almost 
impossible) to devalue the currency.   
But the pre-commitment features of the Convertibility Law went beyond the exchange rate, and 
drastically limited the credit that the Central Bank could freely create for the public and the 
private sectors.  In fact, this strict monetary framework is perhaps much more important than the 
fixed parity itself for price stability, to the extent that it has not allowed, as it usually happened in 
the past, the monetization of sectoral disputes.  However, a mere legal/institutional argument 
begs the question why this strong pre-commitment device was not used before.  We try to answer 
this question in the next sections. 
• The Politics of (Hyper)inflation and Dollarization 
 
The coalition in favor of low inflation had, and still enjoys, broad support: stability of the 
exchange rate became increasingly associated with price stability in the minds of the population, 
and the desire to avoid another episode of hyperinflation (after having gone through two 
experiences) was widely shared by 1991.   
The post-1991 anti-devaluation coalition also included specific groups that may have 
experienced important economic losses in case of depreciation of the exchange rate, such as 
those indebted in dollars.  Table 4 shows the jump in dollar denominated debts.  Credit in dollars 
in the banking system increased by 12.500 millions of pesos (with an almost equivalent value in 
dollars) between 1992 and 1995, and represented about 61% of all banking credit.  The private 
sector issued bonds denominated in foreign currencies for almost 9.000 million dollars between 
1991-1995, three quarters of which had maturities of 5 years or less.  The public sector increased 
its foreign debt by some 25.800 million dollars in the same period.  In addition, there were 
important flows of foreign direct investment and the participation of foreign investors in 
Argentina=s stock exchange increased significantly  
This debt expansion touched large sectors of the population.  Middle and even lower-middle 
income families had access to consumption loans, many of them in dollar terms, generating a 
constituency that was grateful to the government for the expanding consumption possibilities and which became very fearful of a devaluation.  Equally concerned were firms in the private sector 
that accumulated debts in foreign currency, including the banking system, different domestic 
economic groups which, in association with foreign investors, bought State-owned enterprises, 
and construction companies.   On the asset side, foreign direct and portfolio investors were also 
concerned about the stability of the exchange rate.   
Finally, the government, as a big debtor in foreign currency would have been very negatively 
affected by a devaluation, which could have most certainly triggered a fiscal crisis through 
multiple mechanisms.  First, the recession that has usually accompanied devaluations would have 
reduced tax receipts.  Second, the increase in pesos of Argentina’s payments of the external debt 
public would not have been compensated by income in dollars, such as the cases of Mexico with 
oil-linked public revenues or Chile with copper.  Third, the deterioration of the fiscal situation 
would have put downward pressure on public bonds, affecting the privatized social security 
system and the banking system (which had those assets in their portfolios), and any attempt to 
alleviate the problems of the banking and social security system would have compounded the 
fiscal difficulties. 
All in all, the dollarization of debts created a strong constituency for exchange rate stability.  
However, widespread dollarization at the beginning of the 1980’s did not impede the 
devaluations and economic morass linked to the debt crisis during that decade.  Clear differences 
between both episodes, in addition perhaps to the magnitude of dollar indebtedness, have been 
two aspects already discussed: the impact of hyperinflation over the economic behavior of 
Argentines and the institutional basis of Convertibility, with its strong precommitment through a 
legislative act.  But other elements have also contributed to exchange rate stability during the 
1990’s.   
Key elements behind major devaluations in the past had been the distributive disputes over factor 
returns (capital and labor), sectoral incomes (agriculture versus industry), and/or fiscal resources, 
which ended up monetized by passively adjusting monetary policies.  The Convertibility Plan 
established a more disciplined monetary framework, which limited the possibility of 
monetization of those distributive struggles.  But, perhaps more importantly, such distributive 
struggles also appeared to have become more circumscribed in the 1990’s, in part helped by 
higher rates of economic growth.  Fiscal adjustment advanced more than in the previous decade 
(although less than what would have been necessary to ensure a better performance when 
external capital flows dwindled in 1995) and the labor movement showed a relatively subdued 
response to weak wage and employment conditions.   • Sectoral Policy Reform, Productivity and Growth 
 
Although fixing the exchange rate reflected the concerns of a broad spectrum of Argentina’s 
society, the ensuing overvaluation of the real exchange rate negatively affected different 
productive sectors.  But the economic program also included specific policies, which tended to 
moderate the impact of such overvaluation.  The agricultural sector succeeded in eliminating 
export taxes (a long-standing request of rural groups), along with the liberalization of several 
markets for products, inputs, and auxiliary services that were previously regulated (which helped 
to improve the price/cost equation for the sector).  In addition, the decline of the agricultural 
sector as percentage of the GDP weakened a group which, in general, requested or supported 
devaluations of the peso.   
Industrial producers, although affected by the drastic reduction of import tariffs engineered since 
1991, received some help from different selective policies, including reimbursement of indirect 
taxes to exporters, expedited antidumping procedures, and special promotion regimes limited to 
some industries, such as automobiles. 
More generally, all productive sectors benefited, at least initially, from the consumption boom 
usually associated to the establishment of fixed exchange regimes.  When consumption growth 
began to slow down, the implementation of MERCOSUR (once the 1994 Real Plan in Brazil 
changed the usual Argentine trade deficit with its neighbor into a trade surplus) was an important 
stimulant of economic activity and generated further gains in outward orientation and 
productivity.  It can be argued that the increase in productivity due to additional investments, the 
decline in several components of the internal costs linked to deregulation and enhanced 
competition, and greater market opportunities in MERCOSUR were important supply-side 
reasons that contributed to high economic growth in 1991-1994, helped the economy through the 
difficult period of 1995-1996 and led to the significant rebound in 1997.  
However, not all this acceleration in economic activity was based on sustainable supply-side 
measures (including inflows of long-term capital), but was rather aided in good measure by 
reversible capital inflows and over-stimulative monetary and fiscal policies.  This generated the 
conditions for a downturn in 1995, when international conditions changed after the 1994 
Mexican devaluation (IMF, 1995; Diaz Bonilla, 1996).  In opposition to the policy prescription 
of trying to moderate the expansionary impact of capital flows with tighter monetary and fiscal 
policies (see for instance, Calvo et al, 1994, 1996; Schadler et al, 1993), Argentina=s economic 
policies in fact multiplied their influence through a process of rapid credit creation and increased 
public expenditures, which fueled the consumption boom and the high economic growth of 
1991-1994.
15 
                                                  
15 As already mentioned, the Convertibility Law only mandates backing of the monetary base with international 
reserves, but not broader definitions of money supply.  Economic authorities were able to reduce reserve requirements 
for the banking system in 1992-1993 (IMF, 1995; Diaz Bonilla, 1996).  Capital flows and reduced reserve 
requirements led to a rapid expansion of credit  (IMF, 1995), which deteriorated the ratio of monetary aggregates to 
foreign currency reserves (except for the mandatory coverage of the monetary base).  Argentina=s financial system 
began to experience difficulties well before the Mexican devaluation (see for instance Corrigan, 1996).  However, a 
forceful tackling of the problems was delayed (specially in the case of insolvent public banks owned by the Provincial 
States), probably influenced by the political requirements of changing the Constitution in 1994 to get the Presidential 
reelection approved.  Those delays exacerbated the severity of the banking and economic crisis in 1995 (for a more 
detailed discussion, see Diaz Bonilla, 1996).   Overall, expansive monetary and fiscal policies weakened the banking system, made the country 
more vulnerable to the 1994-1995 external shocks, and, combined with a fixed exchange rate 
regime and trade liberalization, had a strong negative impact on different sectors producing 
tradable goods.  This amplified the impact of the reduction of trade barriers and led to the 
bankruptcy of firms that would have been competitive under a different combination of 
macroeconomic policies.
16  More prudent monetary and fiscal policies during 1991-1994 could 
have avoided some of these problems, leaving the country stronger for the changing economic 
conditions in 1995.  
The reasons to avoid tackling the issue of an overheated economy in 1993-1994 appeared to have 
been both economic and political.  At the economic level some voices argued that interventions 
to sterilize capital flows would have been self-defeating because they would have increased 
interest rates, attracted even more capital, and weakened fiscal accounts.  Usually this criticism 
was directed at monetary sterilization of money expansion through the issuing of government 
debt.  In contrast, others (acknowledging the perils of sterilization -see Calvo, 1991) argued, 
correctly, that there were other interventions available, including fiscal tightening, increasing 
banking reserves and improving banking supervision (see Rodriguez, 1993; Calvo et al., 1996; 
Schadler, et al., 1993).    
The political argument was that the expansion was needed to maintain the momentum for 
reforms.
17  The economic team, coming from outside the Peronist Party, did not initially enjoy 
widespread political support within the government, but its standing was strengthened by the 
expansion of consumption and overall positive economic conditions.  In this period of economic 
buoyancy, it was easier to implement the drastic privatization of public sector enterprises, the 
reduction in trade protection, and other difficult measures.  Also, the very good economic 
performance of the economy during those years produced handsome electoral returns for the 
Menem Administration, which won the Congressional midterm elections in 1991 and 1993 and 
the Presidential election in 1995.  
• Fiscal Adjustment 
 
Fiscal deficits of about 6% of GDP in 1988, were reduced to about 3.8% in 1989-1990, 1.6% in 
1991, and declined to almost negligible levels in 1992-1993.   Fiscal consolidation was helped by 
better tax administration and the Olivera-Tanzi effect working in reverse (once inflation declined 
dramatically).  On the expenditure side different factors contributed to place public accounts 
under control: privatizations, the reduction of subsidies to domestic industrial groups, further 
adjustments in military expenditures, the decline in world interest rates and the international debt 
settlement of 1992, under the Brady Plan.  Public accounts improved significantly compared to 
the situation in the 1980’s and this proved enough to forestall the occurrence of an exchange rate 
crisis á la Krugman.    
                                                  
16 This discussion is related to two other issues. The first one is the sustainability of the exchange rate peg if 
the value selected is "too tight" (see for instance J. Williamson, 1994, on UK and the EMU).  A second issue is 
that if an initial value that is "too tight" is combined with a drastic program of trade liberalization, the 
restructuring of the economy may also harm sectors that would not have been considered inefficient under more 
adequate levels of the initial peg (see the seminal works of  Little, I., Scitovsky, T. and Scott, M. (1970) and 
Balassa et al. (1971), and a more recent discussion in Bruton, H., 1989). 
17 At least two high officials of the economic team at that time argued that much in conversations with one of the 
authors of this paper. However, the government did not take advantage of the favorable initial economic conditions to 
place fiscal accounts on a more solid footing to diminish the impact of future external shocks to 
Argentina, and during the key political year of 1994 (when the Constitution was changed to 
allow the Presidential reelection in 1995) the fiscal accounts turned into deficit.
18 Additionally, 
important  distributive issues affecting the public budget are still pending, as witnessed by recent 
 debates in Argentina on tax, labor and education reforms: different social demands increasingly 
put forward by the electorate may well require additional expenditures.  The form of the social 
coalition supporting the current exchange rate regime will be undoubtedly affected by how these 
fiscal redistribution issues develop in the future.   
• The Response of the Labor Movement 
 
The decline of labor unions in Argentina=s economic and political arenas had several facets.  One 
was, of course, the restructuring and downsizing of the industrial sector that began in the 1970’s. 
 At the political level, the progressive weakness of labor unions within the Peronist Party after so 
many years of predominance can be traced to the electoral defeat in the presidential election of 
1983, the first time the Peronist Party had ever lost a general election.  The rejection of the 
Peronist candidates was widely attributed to the dislike of the Argentine electorate for old-guard 
union bosses that were hegemonic within the Peronist Party, and which alienated voters with 
strong-arm tactics and violent slogans.  After another electoral drubbing in the 1985 
Congressional elections, a new current emerged within the Peronist Party at that time.  This 
process generated an important renewal in its leadership, reducing significantly the political clout 
of unions and increasing the presence of middle-class urban leaders.  Under the new leadership, 
the Peronist Party won the 1987 midterm elections, consolidating the presence of non-union 
cadres in its political structure.   
In the presidential primaries within the Peronist Party for the 1989 general election, displaced 
union leaders supported Carlos Saul Menem helping defeat Antonio Cafiero, the leader of the 
1987 renewal movement.  But, once Menem prevailed in the presidential election, the new 
President brought a wholesale change in the political leadership of the Party, further weakening 
the influence of unions in the new Peronist government.   
In the first main confrontation with unions in the case of the privatization of the Empresa 
Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (the public telephone company), the Menem Administration, 
supported by a strong current of public opinion against the notoriously bad service of the 
telephone company, first politically isolated and then fired striking employees.  At the same time, 
it rewarded groups within the company that did not oppose the privatization process.  This sent a 
clear signal to different public sector unions that the economic restructuring of the public sector 
was for real, and that there were tangible costs in opposing it.  On the other hand, labor unions 
were allowed to participate (or to increase their previous participation) in several profitable 
activities related to health services, management of pension funds, and even privatizations, 
opening new economic opportunities for the most business-oriented unions (Murillo, 1997). 
This pattern of selective rewards and punishments was utilized with success to carry on the 
substantial restructuring of Argentina=s public sector.  Particularly, the Menem Administration 
maintained open for a long time the possibility of wholesale reform of labor laws, including 
                                                  
18 IMF=s estimates show a positive fiscal impulse of about 1.5% of the GDP in 1994 (IMF, 1998), which can be 
considered a manifestation in Argentina of the traditional political cycle linked to important elections. reductions in the legal powers and functions of unions in Argentina as a bargaining tool in the ins 
and outs of the relationship between the government and the labor movement. 
By 1996, levels of unemployment not experienced during the last half century, coexisted with 
real wages that, even in the upper estimates, were below the averages for the two decades 
between mid 1960’s and mid 1980’s (Chart 8).
19, 20  As a consequence, a soft labor market also 
contributed to mute the response of workers.
21  
In summary, the decline of industrial employment; the erosion of the political clout of unions 
within the Peronist Party after the 1983 and 1985 electoral defeats; public opposition to 
inefficient public firms; the cleavage between more entrepreneurial unions (trying to take 
advantage of the new business opportunities to provide different services to their affiliates) and 
those oriented to the traditional defense of workers’ rights; and more difficult employment 
conditions post-1994 contributed to mute the response of the labor movement to the drastic 
economic changes implemented by the Menem Administration.  The struggle over factor returns 
that played havoc with previous fixed exchange rate regimes did not achieve the same intensity 
this time.  
• International Conditions 
 
While in the past several instances of exchange rate instability were associated to external 
shocks, the Convertibility Plan in the 1990’s coincided with improved international economic 
conditions. First, in 1989 the newly elected Bush Administration decided to change the approach 
followed until then, opening the possibility of debt reductions through the Brady Plan (which 
Argentina eventually obtained in 1992).   Second, the slowing down of the US economy at the 
beginning of the 1990’s led the Federal Reserve to adopt a more expansionary monetary policy, 
which contributed to lower interest rates in 1991-1992.  This changed international environment, 
along with a better framework of macroeconomic policies in several Latin American countries, 
generated the return of capital to the region, just at the time the Convertibility Plan was being 
implemented.
22  Additionally, the terms of trade that had collapsed in 1986-1987, initiated a slow 
but firm recovery that accelerated towards mid-1990’s, and lasted until 1998 (Chart 7).   
The exchange rate regime was tested when sentiment in world capital markets changed after 
Mexico’s devaluation in 1994.  The fiscal, financial and growth imbalances accumulated during 
                                                  
19 There is some uncertainty regarding data on wages.  Official figures were compiled until 1992 and then 
discontinued.  For 1993 there is no official data.  Then in mid-1994, the Ministry of the Econmy began publishing 
the salary for the workers included in the Integrated System of Retirement and Pensions (about 29% of the work 
force in 1996), which can be considered a high upper bound for the average wage in the economy.  Chart 8 
includes the middle point of three alternative estimates by the authors based on data from the Fundación 
Mediterránea, Carta Económica and the 1994-1997 figures from the Integrated System.  
20 The comparison must be understood in relative terms.  A lower real wage in the 1990's compared to the 
1960's, for example, only means that nominal wages in the current decade are buying less of the standard basket of 
goods and services represented in the Consumer Price Index now, than nominal wages in the 1960's were buying 
of the standard basket then. 
21
 The usual perception regarding wages in Argentina being very high rests on measures of the wages in US 
dollars (see Chart 9, for wages in real 1990 dollars).  The combination of high salaries in dollars and low in pesos is 
still affecting the performance of the Argentine economy, an issue related to the definition of the adequate exchange 
rate in the context of the whole economic program  
22 See Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart, 1992, 1993 for a discussion of the causes of capital inflows to Latin 
America. 1991-1994 left Argentina too weak to withstand the comparatively mild external shock and the 
economy entered in recession in 1995.
23     
However, international organizations and developed countries, particularly the US, were more 
willing to lend financial support to Argentina than in the past.  This had at least two components. 
 First, Argentina was considered to be one of the examples in the implementation of policies of 
“hard money and free markets” (as the policies of the Washington Consensus were summarized), 
and could not be allowed to falter after the problems experienced by Mexico (another of the 
countries that was popularly considered to have followed such recommendations).
24     
The other component was the important change in the international posture of Argentina, 
manifested in aspects such as the participation in the Gulf War and the contribution to peace-
keeping operations of the United Nations.  All this improved the geopolitical evaluation of a 
country that not long ago had been at war with one of NATO’s main countries over the Malvinas 
Islands.    
As a result of this changed evaluation of Argentina’s economic and geopolitical posture, the 
episode of capital flight that occurred after the 1994 Mexican devaluation was compensated in 
great measure by an important financial package put together by the IMF, the IADB, and the 
World Bank, with strong backing by the US government.  This had not happened during the 
1980’s debt crisis. 
• Conclusion  
 
The 1989-1990 hyperinflation experiences led to the emergence of a broad based coalition in 
favor of stability, which, because expectations of devaluations and inflation had become far more 
synchronized than before, gave strong backing to the implementation of the strict fixed exchange 
rate system of the Convertibility Law.  This institutional innovation practically eliminated any 
discretion in the management of the exchange rate while substantially limiting the use of passive 
monetary policies to accommodate distributional conflicts.   Additionally, those distributional 
conflicts appeared to have diminished in intensity, in part because of the way the Menem 
Administration handled traditional power centers such as the military and the labor unions.  
Finally, supporting international conditions and domestic growth created the conditions for side 
payments to some of the affected groups.   
Although the desire for economic stability is still very strong in Argentina and it focuses 
basically on the exchange rate arrangement, the contours of the stability coalition may be 
changing in the future to the extent that economic international and domestic conditions, in the 
aftermath of the Asian, Russian and Brazilian financial crises, weaken further, and distributive 
issues resurface.   
 
                                                  
23 See Diaz-Bonilla (1996) for a comparison of the 1982 and 1994 external shocks to Argentina.  It is shown that 
while in 1982 the whole Latin-American region entered in recession, the 1995 episode was mainly circumscribed to 
Mexico and Argentina, suggesting that internal conditions rather than the external shock, were the main reasons for the 
ensuing economic recession.   
24 In fact, Mexico had also implemented unsustainable monetary and financial policies in 1994, linked to its own 
political cycle.  See the economic analysis in Calvo and Mendoza, 1996 IV. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
IV.1 INTRODUCTION   
 
We have argued that during the classical ISI exchange rate policies reflected the dual distributive 
conflict between agriculture and industry, and between capital and labor.  Devaluations were 
controversial but controlled events, which improved the price of agricultural goods and cut real 
wages.  Later, however, in the context of an open capital account with large fiscal deficits, a 
weak financial system, and spreading dollarization, devaluations began to have increasingly 
negative systemic effects on inflation and growth, which eventually overshadowed traditional 
distributional issues.  Inflation that was a problem even for non-elected military governments 
became even more relevant for the political process once democracy returned in 1983.  By then 
devaluations and expectations of inflation had become largely synchronized, and manipulating 
inflation by controlling the exchange rate produced positive political results for the incumbent, 
as was the case of the Austral plan in 1985 and with the Menem Administration up until 1997.  
The other side of the coin was the political price paid by the Radical Party, in 1987, and 
especially after the hyperinflationary experience of 1989.  In what follows we explore 
quantitatively these arguments. 
IV. 2.  DISTRIBUTIONAL ISSUES  
 
We begin by analyzing one of the key distributional issues: the impact of devaluations on real 
wages.  Granger-causality tests (see Table 5) provide a first approximation. For the whole period 
1955-1997, the null hypothesis that real wage and the exchange rate do not Granger-cause each 
other, is not rejected.  However, for the shorter period 1955-1976, the period of traditional ISI, 
the null of no Granger-causation in both directions is strongly rejected.  This appears in line with 
the hypothesis that during the ISI period the distributional conflict involved the interaction of 
devaluation and real wages, while later the mechanism appears to have changed.  
To analyze this issue further, we utilize an unrestricted VAR to study the impulse-response 
functions.
25  We consider Argentina terms of trade as an exogenous  variable, and then run a 
VAR with the exchange rate, GDP and real wages (using that ordering for identification of the 
shocks).
26   
For the whole period, the impulse-response functions suggest that a devaluation results mainly in 
                                                  
25 The length of the VAR models was established considering the Schwartz criteria (due to the importance of the 
degrees of freedom) and the behavior of the residuals.  The residuals were checked to ensure normality, 
homoskedasticity and lack of autocorrelation.  The impulse-response functions were calculated with 100 Monte Carlo 
repetitions.  A general discussion of estimation and inference in Vector Autorregressive models can be found in 
Canova, 1994; see also Sims, Stock and Watson, 1990.     
26 The 3-equation VAR can be derived from a setting where aggregate supply depends on capital stock, 
employment and intermediate inputs, and aggregate demand has a domestic component (that depends on income and 
assets), and net exports (that depends on the exchange rate and terms of trade).  Also, labor demand depends on real 
wages and the level of activity for a given stock of capital; labor supply depends on real wages; and the demand for 
intermediate inputs (which have an important component of imports) depends on the exchange rate and world prices.  
With aggregate demand equal to aggregate supply, a clearing labor market, and capital stock and assets fixed in each 
temporary equilibrium, the VAR utilized here follows.   a fall of GDP in the first two periods (where the confidence bands show statistical significance), 
with negligible declines in real wages (and the significance is not different from zero) (Chart 13, 
first column of graphics).  Also, increases in real wages appear to lead to devaluations (third 
column). 
The hypothesis of the contractionary effect of devaluations (see for instance Krugman and 
Taylor, 1978), which seems to be borne by the impulse-response functions, may be the result of 
the supply side shock affecting intermediate imports and/or the demand shock resulting from 
nominal assets (mainly money supply) that are cut in real terms by the devaluation and/or a 
banking crisis, leading to sharp declines in deposits and credit, which would affect both 
aggregate supply and demand.   
However, if the VAR model is estimated separately over the period before an after the 1978 
opening of the capital account (see Charts 14 A and 14 B), there are two important differences.  
First, the negative impact of a devaluation of real wages is stronger and statistically better 
defined in the period 1955-1977.  Second, the recessionary impact on the GDP is larger and 
significant in the years after 1978, compared to a smaller, and statistically not significant, effect 
during the traditional ISI period.     
It appears that during the ISI period, devaluations could be utilized to cut real wages, and that, 
after the initial negative impact, the economy began to grow again.  But after 1978, the responses 
to devaluations have been deeper and longer declines in economic activity, with real wages 
changing far less than before.  Real wages fell more (i.e., workers were Asurprised@) in the 1960’s 
and 1970’s than in next two decades, when workers seem to have been able to get their nominal 
wages adjusted up after a devaluation occurred.  This reduced the positive supply-side impact 
that upward adjustments of the nominal exchange rate may have had on external 
competitiveness, leaving only the negative impact of devaluations on GDP growth through other 
channels such as the increase in costs of imported intermediate inputs and the decline in real 
money supply.  
Other distributional impact of the devaluations is associated with the price of agricultural vis-a-
vis non-agricultural goods.  The Granger causality tests (Table 6) suggest that the main influence 
on the ratio of agricultural to non-agricultural prices comes from world prices.  However, there is 
a clear difference between the ISI period, when the ratio of agricultural to non-agricultural prices 
is Granger-caused by world prices, and the period since the mid-1970’s where the influence of 
the exchange rate on that ratio increases.  
The impulse-response functions show that the domestic price ratio for the whole period basically 
followed world real prices (Chart 15).
27  However, since the mid 1970’s onwards the VAR model 
suggests a greater role for devaluations (see Chart 16).  A possible interpretation is that during 
the ISI period, when high real agricultural prices prevailed in world markets, the exchange rate 
had to be adjusted periodically only when crises erupted.  However, once world agricultural real 
                                                  
27 The VAR is constructed considering that the domestic price of agricultural goods depends on the exchange rate, 
world agricultural prices, and commercial policies.  The domestic price of non agricultural goods is a linear 
combination of the domestic price of industrial goods (which in turn depends on world industrial prices, the exchange 
rate and commercial policies) and the domestic price of services.  If commercial and other policies do not change, the 
ratio of domestic agricultural to non agricultural prices depends on the real world price of agricultural goods (which is 
deflated by manufacturing unit values) and the nominal exchange rate. The ordering for the VAR is world prices, 
nominal exchange rate and domestic prices.  prices began to fall in the 1980s, some of the governments tried to compensate the persistent 
decline through devaluations.  This of course, led to higher inflation (see below).      
Also, the idea that a devaluation benefited unequivocally the agricultural sector has to be seen in 
a broader context.  Another VAR model with the exchange rate and two indices of agricultural 
and industrial production, shows that for the whole period a devaluation had a negative impact 
on industrial production, and only a positive one on agriculture after having gone through an 
initial decline (see Chart 17).   But again, the periods before and after mid-1970’s show different 
responses to a devaluation.  During the ISI period, the negative impact of a devaluation on 
industry is smaller and eventually there is a return to growth, while the positive effect on 
agriculture is far stronger than for the whole period (Chart 18 A).  In the period after 1978 (Chart 
18 B), a devaluation affects negatively both agriculture and industry.   
The conclusion is that even though a devaluation since the 1980’s would have improved relative 
prices for agriculture, it would also have had a negative impact on agricultural growth.  This may 
reflect larger forward and backward links of the agricultural sector with the rest of the economy, 
as well as the stronger negative effects on GDP growth of a devaluation during the last decades 
compared to the ISI period. Therefore it can be argued that the relative price effect of a 
devaluation, with its distributional advantage for agriculture, may have been more than 
compensated by the income effect of a fall in production, at least for the period after 1978.   
These new dynamics of the devaluations, with its broader-based effects, tended to dominate the 
issue of relative factor returns as a main concern for policy makers and the public.  Part of this 
shift may be related to the growing role of the exchange rate as a nominal anchor for 
expectations.  This issue is explored immediately.  
IV. 3 THE POLITICS OF INFLATION AND DEVALUATION 
(a) Increasing coordination of expectations  
 
The relationship between devaluation and inflation is analyzed here with Granger-causality and 
cointegration tests, applying Johansen=s procedure, on quarterly data from 1957 to 1997.  The 
results appear in Tables 7 and 8.   
The Granger-causality tests suggest that the rates of inflation and devaluation
28 have become 
more coordinated over time: non Granger causality in both directions is strongly rejected for the 
whole period, and also for the period after the opening of the capital account (although at a 
somewhat lower significance level).  On the other hand, for the 60’s and 70’s only the null of 
devaluation not causing inflation is rejected, suggesting that in the earlier period devaluations 
preceded higher inflation, but not necessarily the other way around.  
Another way to look at this issue is to ask whether both variables are cointegrated.  Unit root 
tests show that the exchange rate and the CPI in levels are I(2), while their rates of change are 
I(1).  Therefore it is appropriate to ask about the possible cointegration relationship between 
rates.  
                                                  
28 Devaluation is measured as the rate of change of the nominal exchange rate in pesos per $US, and inflation is 
measured as the rate of growth of the CPI.  Both rate growths were calculated in levels and not as the difference of 
logarithms because the values differed significantly for the period of hyperinflation.  Performing a standard Johansen test
29 before and after the opening up of the capital account 
(December 1978), the null of at least one cointegrating equation cannot be rejected for the period 
without capital controls (see Table 8).  However, the same test for the period 1959:1-1978:4, 
cannot reject the null of no cointegration (i.e., zero cointegrating equations).  This suggests that 
while the rates of inflation and devaluation moved somewhat independently from each other in 
the 60s and 70s, this was not longer the case in the 80s and 90s.  
The VAR impulse-response functions tell a similar story (see Charts 19 and 20).  Inflation reacts 
later and less strongly to a devaluation during the 1959-1978 period (Chart 19), than after the 
opening of the capital account (Chart 20).  
The conclusion is that after the devaluations of the mid-seventies and early eighties, inflation, 
and presumably inflationary expectations as well, appear to have been more linked to the 
exchange rate than before.
30  Basically, the greater coordination between devaluation and 
inflation after the eighties, leads to the politics of inflation as the determinant factor for exchange 
rate policies.   
(b) Electoral results  
  
 In political terms, with the restoration of  democracy after 1983,  the question became what 
types of issues were selected by the electorate to reward or punish incumbents at the voting 
booth.  In economic terms the most obvious issues are inflation and unemployment.  Charts 21 
and 22 are scatter diagrams showing the percentage vote for the incumbent in the presidential 
and congressional elections since the return to democracy in 1983, against (the log of) inflation 
and unemployment, respectively 
31/.   Inflation appears negatively correlated with the votes for 
the incumbent, while unemployment does not show any strong correlation.  
 
 Table 9 shows the results of a simple regression exploring the link between inflation and 
unemployment, on one hand, and votes for the incumbent, on the other (see for instance,  Fair, R, 
1996 and Lewis-Beck and Rice, 1992) 
32/.  Given the lack of degrees of freedom the results are 
                                                  
29 The test was run with 6 lags to whiten the residuals and with an intercept in the Cointegrating Equation, but not 
in the VAR.  The main thrust of the results hold under other specifications.  
30 For instance, Calvo and Vegh (1998) argue that the exchange rate “provides a much clearer signal to the public 
of the government’s intentions and actual actions than a money supply target.  Thus if the public’s inflationary 
expectations are influenced to a large extent by the ability to easily track and continuously monitor the nominal 
anchor, the exchange rate has a natural advantage.” (p.46) 
31  Since 1983 and until the time this was written (April 1999) there have been three  presidential and congressional 
elections (1983, 1989, 1995) and the percentage vote utilized for the incumbent corresponds to the Presidential 
candidate; the rest were only congressional elections (1985, 1987, 1991 and 1993) and the percentage vote was for the 
political parties as a whole.  The 1983 election is not included in the diagrams as there was no incumbent, being the 
first democratic election after a military regime. A special election to elect representatives to change the Constitution 
is not included in the diagrams either.  Inflation and unemployment correspond to the year average.  
32  The equation includes all elections mentioned in the previous footnote.  As there was not an incumbent in the 
1983 election we chose the Peronist Party as the incumbent, because it can be argued that the Radical candidate, Raul 
Alfonsín, was successful in portraying Peronist candidates as the continuation of the previous military regime.  There 
are dummies for 1983 (trying to capture the special conditions of the first election after a military regime), and for 
Presidential elections, considering that they may be different from the other elections.  
 only suggestive, but they coincide with the bivariate diagrams in showing that inflation appears 
negatively correlated with the vote of the incumbent.  Also, the coefficient for inflation is 
statistically significant, but its small size suggests that the political impact is important only at 
high levels of inflation.  Adjusting for other influences, also unemployment appears negatively 
correlated with the vote of the incumbent, but is not statistically significant.  However, during the 
last election in 1997 the issue of unemployment showed a greater salience, suggesting that the 
politics of unemployment may be increasing its importance vis-a-vis the politics of 
(hyper)inflation. 
  
 IV. 4 CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The VAR impulse-response functions show that devaluations did indeed modify sectoral 
returns to different social groups and productive sectors over the whole period considered: they 
affected  real wages (which were cut during the ISI period but less so since the end of the 1970's) 
and the relative price of agricultural/non agricultural goods (which tended to improve, but was 
basically dominated by world prices).   However, the distributional and other consequences of 
adjustments in nominal exchange rates, produced different impacts during the traditional ISI 
period with capital account controls, compared to the subsequent years.  Since the end of the 
1970's, the impact of a devaluation appears to have been less on relative prices (which appeared 
to be more rigid, particularly real wages) and more on overall growth: devaluations came to 
affect negatively even sectors (such as agriculture) which were supposed to benefit from upward 
adjustments of the nominal exchange rate.  
 
 Also, devaluations generated inflation in the sixties and seventies but with a lag and the 
impact was smaller than later on. During the period with trade and capital controls, devaluation 
and inflation were not as synchronized as they became later, and to the extent that there was a 
linkage, it ran from devaluations to inflation.  However, once the capital account was opened in 
the second half of the seventies, and the country experienced traumatic devaluations in 1975 and 
the beginning of the 1980's, expectations of inflation and devaluation became  more closely 
coordinated; for the period since 1979 inflation and devaluation cointegrate and Granger 
causation in both directions cannot be ruled out.   
 
 With the advent of democracy, the electorate was able to manifest its preferences over 
economic and other issues.  Inflation appears to have been the main concern at high levels of that 
variable and to the extent that it was linked to the nominal exchange rate, devaluations became a 
political liability.  Now, at the current configuration of inflation-unemployment levels, the latter 
may be turning into a more determinant factor for the percentage vote of the incumbent.  
However, the statistical analysis does not suggest that the link between devaluation and  inflation 
has been broken.  Therefore, the political costs of a devaluation may be as significant as before.    
 
V. EXCHANGE RATE POLICIES: FROM THE POLITICS OF REDISTRIBUTION TO 
THE POLITICS OF INFLATION AND BEYOND 
 
The main goal of this paper has been to examine the political economy of Argentina since the 1950s in order to explain exchange rate crises and policies.  We began with Di Tella’s (1987) 
observation regarding the existence of a cycle with two phases in exchange rate policy: the 
“repressed stage,” when some key prices (including the exchange rate) are controlled to tame 
inflation, and the “loosening stage,” when those controls collapse and inflation jumps to new 
levels.  We emphasized that this regularity extended beyond the period analyzed by Di Tella, and 
that the cycle became shorter and more violent since the mid-1980s and until the beginning of 
1991.  During those years, the periods of fixed exchange rates lasted less than before and the 
“ratcheting up” effect on inflation increased.  Since 1991, however, with the  “Convertibility 
Law,” which pegged the peso to the dollar one-to-one, the “loosening” stage has not taken place, 
even after the “tequila effect” in 1995 and, since 1997, the financial crises in Asia, Russia and 
Brazil.  
The questions, then, are why these cycles of repression and loosening of the exchange rate have 
taken place in Argentina, why they have become shorter and more explosive in the second half of 
the 1980s, and why they seem to have disappeared since the 1991 Convertibility Plan.  Briefly, 
we claimed that in the first period, the step-wise adjustments reflect the politics of redistribution 
in the context of ISI with capital controls, within an international environment in which, in 
general, Argentina enjoyed more favorable terms of trade than in subsequent decades.  This 
development strategy was based on the redistribution of the still sizable agrarian surplus toward 
industry, which benefited urban groups, and an expanding public sector.  This pattern of 
redistribution among landowners, industrialists, and workers, led to recurrent, though usually 
gradual, strangulations in the trade balance, eventually corrected by adjustments in the exchange 
rate.  Controls in the capital account allowed governments to manage the timing and size of the 
devaluations.  Exchange rate crises during this period were thus of a slow-motion nature, fueled 
by the deterioration of the trade accounts over time. 
While the economy during this period was dominated by the stop-go nature of the ISI strategy, 
the politics, related to the distributional struggle among landowners, industrialists and urban 
workers, was played in a context of the exclusion of the Peronist Party, leading to what 
O’Donnell (1973) labeled the  “impossible game” of Argentina’s party competition.  The return 
of Peronism to the government in the 1973 election (after almost 20 years of proscription) 
marked the economic and political culmination of the classical ISI period, but it ended in 
political turmoil after the death of President Juan Perón.  Determined to dismantle the ISI policy 
structure and dissolve the social base of Peronism, the military regime of 1976 opened a new 
phase.  
In this period, wage redistribution was avoided by political control.  The politics of redistribution 
shifted increasingly toward the resources of the public sector, with the Armed Forces emerging 
as major competitors in the tug-of-war for fiscal resources.  Despite wage freezes and 
improvements in tax collection, fiscal discipline was further eroded by the same military who 
became a major claimant on government funds through defense expenditures and transfers to 
public enterprises in the heavy industry sector, many linked to the military structure.  Toward the 
end of the 1970s, capital inflows provided temporary relief, though leading to a much more 
constrained fiscal situation once world macroeconomic conditions deteriorated in the early 1980s 
and the accumulated external debt had to be repaid.  The conduct of monetary policy became 
more complicated by the opening up of the capital account, the continuous dollarization of the 
economy, and the newly liberalized, but ill-regulated, financial sector.  Moreover, because 
inflation remained generally high during this period, the Olivera-Tanzi effect worked against the possibility of placing fiscal accounts under control. 
In the context of a weak fiscal and financial position, the full liberalization of the capital account 
in 1978, opened a new chapter.  The currency became the target of speculative attacks along the 
lines of Krugman’s model (1979) and extended in Calvo (1996), leading to further dollarization 
of the economy and to recurrent events of sudden depletion of foreign exchange reserves.   
With the return to democracy, the Radical Party, trying to woo the labor sector, a traditional 
Peronist bastion, increased salaries, while at the same time tried to maintain a competitive 
exchange rate, all of which increased inflation further.  When policies were changed with the 
1985 Austral Plan, it was clear that an anti-inflationary posture yielded important electoral and 
the Alfonsín Administration won the first midterm election in that year.  However, the economic 
and political conflict between utilizing the exchange rate as a nominal anchor to tame inflation or 
as a real price, continued unresolved during the Radical government.  The collapse of world 
agricultural prices in the second half of the 1980’s added to the economic difficulties of the 
Alfonsín Administration.  The combination of all these factors led to more frequent and more 
explosive crises.  The electoral defeats of the Radical Party were related to high and accelerating 
inflation, ending in the hyperinflationary episode of 1989. The politics of redistribution was thus 
displaced by the politics of (hyper)inflation. 
A new phase began in the early 1990s, with the emergence of a broad coalition in favor of 
stability.  The adjustments needed mainly in fiscal accounts and in terms of the opening up of the 
economy, were made less difficult by a greatly improved international context in the 1990s with 
capital flows returning to Argentina (marking the end of the 1980s debt crisis) and better terms 
of trade.  The Convertibility Law, transforming the central bank in a currency board gave a 
strong institutional foundation to stability, practically eliminating the possibility of passive 
monetary policies accommodating sectoral or factor demands.    
Additionally, those distributional conflicts appeared to have diminished in intensity, and 
supporting international conditions and domestic growth created the conditions for side 
payments to some of the affected groups.  Also, due to larger capital inflows, credit in dollars 
expanded significantly at the level of middle and even lower-middle income groups, which 
became very fearful of a devaluation.  The post-1991 anti-devaluation coalition included as well 
other groups heavily indebted in dollars, such as the government itself, the banking system, and 
the private sector investors who participated in the privatization process and took on an 
important amount of external debt to finance the acquisitions. 
The decline of labor unions (product of economic forces such as the restructuring and 
downsizing of the industrial sector as well as political developments that weakened their clout 
within the Peronist Party) also changed the economic and political components of the traditional 
Peronist alliance and opened the way for a different social and political coalition more 
preoccupied with inflation.  
In sum, we have argued that a new and broadly-based coalition emerged in the first half of the 
1990s that prioritized monetary stability over unemployment, because of vivid memories of 
hyperinflation, along with a different perception of costs and benefits of exchange rate policies, 
due to changes in the structure of the economy and in their relative position in this new structure. 
Looking to the future, the main question refers to the continuation of the stability coalition given 
the strains posed by unemployment levels not experienced in Argentina since the Great 
Depression.  Popular complaints about unemployment and unequal distribution of economic growth, in addition to other claims for improved governance and social issues, may be changing 
the economic and political picture of current Argentina.  These pressures will be most likely 
exacerbated by the difficult international climate that began with the 1997 Asian devaluations 
and was worsened by the financial crises in Russia and Brazil.  
In that context it would not be surprising if more voices are raised in Argentina blaming the 
current exchange rate system for the deteriorating economic conditions and asking for its change, 
presumably by letting the peso float.  Although the economic validity of this proposal may be 
dubious (the experience of past crises in Argentina and elsewhere show the negative impact of 
devaluations in economies with widespread dollarization and vulnerable financial systems), a 
prolonged recession with high levels of unemployment, may lead to increasing political pressures 
Ato do something@.  For some social groups and political forces abandoning the Convertibility 
Plan may look increasingly attractive.       
The polar opposite would be to fully dollarize the economy (i.e., buy out all physical pesos in the 
economy with the dollars held by the Central Bank), an option suggested by the Menem 
Administration.
33  Full dollarization will also require to re-denominate in dollars the banking 
accounts now held in pesos, which can be done if confidence in the banking system is 
maintained. Argentina=s financial system has been strengthened by the changes that took place 
since 1996, mainly in the form of buyouts by international banks, increased capital and banking 
reserves, and the Central Bank=s securing of contingent lines of liquidity from international 
private banks.  Therefore, a hypothetical run on the currency does not have to become a run on 
the banking system.   
With the quasi-full dollarization of the Convertibility Law, or with a total conversion of pesos to 
dollars, for the government and the private sector indebted in dollars, the issue would still be one 
of solvency and how to generate the revenues through taxes or the cash flow through economic 
activities to serve the debt, and prospects that can be seriously impaired by a deep recession.  If 
the Convertibility Plan is abandoned, for those economic agents with debts in dollars and income 
in pesos, an additional problem will be access to foreign currency.    
In the medium term it may well be that more creative forms of monetary and exchange rate 
arrangements end up being implemented.  Two alternatives, which embody very different 
economic and geopolitical programs, would be a formal dollarization of the Argentine economy 
in the context of a monetary agreement with the USA, or the creation of a regional currency in 
MERCOSUR.  These options will have their own distinctive political economy considerations.   
In the short-run, however, the key concern is how to balance the distribution of the fiscal costs 
and benefits involved in confronting the difficult economic conditions, particularly how to 
generate the fiscal revenues to assuage expanding social demands,  to deal with high 
unemployment levels, to improve the competitiveness of the private sector, and to pay for the 
external debt. The distributional issue is still located at the level of the public budget, and the 
operation of the current exchange rate regime may well depend upon how these different 
pressures evolve.  The transparent, efficient and equitable management of fiscal accounts is 
                                                  
33 Full dollarization is not significantly different from the current system.  The main difference would be the loss 
of revenues by the Central Bank of about 600-800 million dollars, corresponding to interests received  on foreign 
currency reserves invested abroad.  A possible The proponents of dollarization present as a countervailing benefit the 
possible reduction in some of the components of the country risk premium paid by Argentina, mainly those linked to 
lingering doubts in the markets regarding the continuation of the current exchange rate parity.  probably where Argentina’s most critical test, namely, consolidating economic stability along 
with democratic institutions, resides.  BIBLIOGRAPHY 
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TABLE 1 PRESIDENTS AND MINISTERS OF THE ECONOMY 
 
Arturo Frondizi,  May 1958    Donato del Carril, May 1958 
Alvaro Alsogaray, June 1959 
  Roberto Alemann, April 1961 
Jose M. Guido, March 1962  Coll Benegas, Jan. 1962; Jorge Wehbe, March 1962  
Federico Pinedo, April 1962; A. Alsogaray, May 1962 
E. Mendez Delfino, December 1962  
  J.M. Martinez de Hoz, May 1963 
Arturo Illia, October 1963   Eugenio Blanco, December 1963 
  Juan C. Pugliese, August 1964 
    
Juan C. Ongania, June 1966  Jorge Salimei, June 1966 
  A.Krieger Vasena, January 1967 
  J.M.Dagnino Pastore, June 1969 
Roberto Levingston, June 1970  C.Moyano Llerena, June 1970 
Aldo Ferrer, October 1970 
Alejandro Lanusse, March 1971     
Juan Quilici, June 1971 
Cayetano Licciardo, October 1971 
Jorge Wehbe, October 1972 
Hector Campora, May 1973  Jose Gelbard, May 1973 
Raul Lastiri, July 1973     Juan D. Peron, October 1973  
Isabel Peron, July 1974     
Alfredo Gomez Morales, October 1974 
  Celestino Rodrigo, Junio 1975 
Pedro Bonanni, July 1975 
Antonio Cafiero, Aug.1975 
Emilio Mondelli, Febr.1976 
Jorge Videla, March 1976    J.Martinez de Hoz, March 1976 
 
Roberto Viola, March 1981   Lorenzo Sigaut, March 1981 
    
Leopoldo Galtieri, November 1981   Roberto Alemann, December 1981 
    
Reynaldo Bignone, July 1982  J.Dagnino Pastore, July1982 
J.Wehbe, August 1982 
Raul Alfonsin, Diciembre 1983  Bernardo Grinspun, Diciembre 1983 
  Juan Sourrouille, Febrero 1985 
J.C. Pugliese, March 1989  
J. Rodriguez, Mayo 1989 
Carlos Menem, Julio 1989   Miguel Angel Roig, Julio 1989 
Nestor Rapanelli, Julio 1989 
Erman Gonzalez, Diciembre 1989 
Domingo Cavallo, Enero 1991 
Roque Fernandez, Julio 1996 TABLE 2   EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES  
 
A. ISI PERIOD 
 
-Important devaluation in 1959 
-1960-1961 dirty float 
-In 1961, fixed exchange regime.  
-1962 first quarter: important devaluation.  
-First quarter 1962-first quarter 1967; flexible exchange rate under different governments 
-First quarter 1967-first half 1970; strong initial devaluation and then fixed exchange 
rate. 
-From mid-1970 to the first quarter of 1973; multiple exchange rates with a changing 
mix of commercial and financial rates for different transactions.   
-Second quarter 1973-last quarter 1974; fixed exchange rate.  
-Strong devaluation in the last quarter of 1974  
-Another strong devaluation in the second quarter of 1975 (el "Rodrigazo") (transition 
towards the inflationary period) 
 
B.  INFLATIONARY PERIOD 
 
-March 1976-December 1978; passive crawling peg 
-December 1978-first quarter of 1981; pre-announced sliding peg ("Tablita").  The 
system collapsed in 1981  
-First quarter 1981-June 1985; floating exchange rate/ adjusted passively to inflation, 
until Austral Plan of June 1985.  
-June 1985-first quarter of 1991; four different attempts at fixing or controlling to some 
degree the exchange rate (Austral and Primavera plans during the Alfonsin Administration and 
the programs implemented by Rapanelli and Erman Gonzalez during the Menem 
Administration),  all of them ending in episodes of sharp devaluations and very high inflation. 
 
C.  STABILITY 
 
-March 1991 to the present; the "Convertibility Plan", which pegged the peso to the 
dollar one-to-one, and transformed the Central Bank into a quasi currency board. TABLE 3 FISCAL COST OF PRIVATE SUBSIDIES (million of US$) 
 1987   1988  1989  1990    
 
Industrial Promotion  792.8   743.8   868.0  1123.0   
Procurement   660.0    870.0    590.0    734.0 
Export Promotion  589.7   701.0   693.0    632.0   
 
TOTAL   2042.5  2314.8  2151.0  2489.0   
 
Source: World Bank, 1993 (Tables A1.1.7 and A1.1.12, from Annex 1.1) 
 
 
TABLE 4 DOLLARIZATION AND EXTERNAL DEBT 
 
 
1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 
1.Banking System (stock;end period)      
  -Dollar deposits (mill.pesos)    6583  10842  17532  23555  23590  28405  33475 a/ 
  -Dollar deposits(% M3)       32.9        33.6        36.6       41.9        43.7        43.9      43.3  a/ 
  -Credit in dollars (stock;mill.pesos)        
-Private sector      9198  15488  20945  27382  28523  31684  37992  
-Public sector         ...       4010      3270     3429      3544      4432      5230   
-Total           ...   19498  24215  30811  32067  36116  43222 
  -Credit in dollars (% credit)     50.6        54.2        53.1       58.9        61.2        62.7        64.3    
 
2.Foreign Direct Investment 
  -Flows (million US$)        ...        4044     2556    3066    4179        ...         ... 
  -Accumulated investment           ...   14829   16476     20401  24630        ...          ... 
 
3.Bond Issues, Private  
  -Flows (million .US$)        265      1230       3902    2580         952     2539            ... 
 
4.Public Debt(Stock; Billion of US$) 
  -Local Currency           1.2      0.7      5.9      7.3       6.7     10.7         ... 
  -Foreign Currency      57.2       58.4     61.9       72.2     83.0     89.0        ...  
-External Debt      57.2      57.4     60.3       69.6     68.2     72.5          ... 
-Internal Debt        0.0          1.0         1.6            2.6     14.8     16.5          ... 
-Total         58.4      59.1       67.8        79.5      89.7      99.7     109.4. 
 
a/ End of third quarter  
 TABLE 5 GRANGER-CAUSALITY TESTS: REAL WAGES AND NOMINAL EXCHANGE 
RATE  
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests    
Sample: 1955 1997 ; Lags: 2    
Null Hypothesis:           Obs  F-Statistic Probability 
 
 
  REAL WAGE does not Granger Cause EXCHANGE RATE   40   0.18141  0.83487 
  EXCHANGE RATE does not Granger Cause REAL WAGE      0.59682  0.55607 
 
Sample: 1955 1976;  Lags: 2    
Null Hypothesis:           Obs  F-Statistic Probability 
 
 
  REAL WAGE does not Granger Cause EXCHANGE RATE   20   7.08484  0.00682 
  EXCHANGE RATE does not Granger Cause REAL WAGE     12.9346  0.00054 
  
 
Sample: 1977 1997; Lags: 2    
Null Hypothesis:           Obs  F-Statistic Probability 
 
  REAL WAGE does not Granger Cause EXCHANGE RATE   20   0.15172  0.86053 
  EXCHANGE RATE does not Granger Cause REAL WAGE      0.91526  0.42165 TABLE 6 GRANGER-CAUSALITY TESTS: DEVALUATION AND RELATIVE PRICES 
 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests    
Sample: 1950 1997      
Lags: 2    
 
  Null Hypothesis:                  Obs  F-Statistic Probability 
 
  EXCHANGE RATE does not Granger Cause WORLD REAL AGRICULTURAL PRICES     35   0.32409   0.72568 
  WORLD REAL AGRICULTURAL PRICES does not Granger Cause EXCHANGE RATE       3.42192   0.04585 
 
  RELATIVE PRICES AGRIC/NON AGRICULT. does not Granger Cause WORLD REAL AGRICULT. PRICES 35   1.00529   0.37793 
  WORLD REAL AGRICULT. PRICES does not Granger Cause RELATIVE PRICES AGRIC/NON AGRICULT.   3.34404   0.04886 
 
  RELATIVE PRICES AGRIC/NON AGRICULT. does not Granger Cause EXCHANGE RATE     35   0.04252  
 0.95843 




Pairwise Granger Causality Tests    
Sample: 1950 1978      
Lags: 2    
 
  Null Hypothesis:                  Obs  F-Statistic Probability 
 
  EXCHANGE RATE does not Granger Cause WORLD REAL AGRICULTURAL PRICES     17   9.60543   0.00323 
  WORLD REAL AGRICULTURAL PRICES does not Granger Cause EXCHANGE RATE        3.57696   0.06047 
 
  RELATIVE PRICES AGRIC/NON AGRICULT. does not Granger Cause WORLD REAL AGRICULT. PRICES 17   1.35804   0.29399 
  WORLD REAL AGRICULT. PRICES does not Granger Cause RELATIVE PRICES AGRIC/NON AGRICULT.   8.59318   0.00483 
 
  RELATIVE PRICES AGRIC/NON AGRICULT. does not Granger Cause EXCHANGE RATE     17  0.10239  
 0.90346 




Pairwise Granger Causality Tests    
Sample: 1978 1997      
Lags: 2    
 
  Null Hypothesis:                  Obs  F-Statistic Probability 
 
  EXCHANGE RATE does not Granger Cause WORLD REAL AGRICULTURAL PRICES     19   0.67229   0.52627 
  WORLD REAL AGRICULTURAL PRICES does not Granger Cause EXCHANGE RATE        1.44112   0.26970 
 
  RELATIVE PRICES AGRIC/NON AGRICULT. does not Granger Cause WORLD REAL AGRICULT. PRICES 19   0.47353   0.63242 
  WORLD REAL AGRICULT. PRICES does not Granger Cause RELATIVE PRICES AGRIC/NON AGRICULT.   1.47752   0.26170 
 
  RELATIVE PRICES AGRIC/NON AGRICULT. does not Granger Cause EXCHANGE RATE      19   3.60038 
 0.05476 
  EXCHANGE RATE does not Granger Cause RELATIVE PRICES AGRIC/NON AGRICULT.       4.99030  
 0.02311 
 TABLE 7 GRANGER-CAUSALITY: INFLATION AND DEVALUATION  
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests    
Sample: 1957:1 1997:4      
Lags: 2    
 
  Null Hypothesis:           Obs  F-Statistic Probability 
 
  DEVALUATION does not Granger Cause INFLATION   151   183.263   0.00000 
  INFLATION does not Granger Cause DEVALUATION      6.02627   0.00306 
 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests    
Sample 1957:1 1978:4      
Lags: 2    
 
  Null Hypothesis:           Obs  F-Statistic Probability 
 
  DEVALUATION does not Granger Cause INFLATION   77   32.2001   1.0E-10 
  INFLATION does not Granger Cause DEVALUATION     0.60681   0.54785 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests       
Sample: 1979:1 1997:4      
Lags: 2    
 
  Null Hypothesis:           Obs  F-Statistic Probability 
 
  DEVALUATION does not Granger Cause INFLATION   74   108.162   0.00000 
  INFLATION does not Granger Cause DEVALUATION      2.86563    0.06375 
 
 





Sample: 1957:1 1978:4       
Included observations: 72     
Test assumption: No deterministic trend in the data     
Series: INFLATION DEVALUATION      
Lags interval: 1 to 2, 3 to 4, 5 to 6     
 
Likelihood 5 Percent  1 Percent  Hypothesized 
Eigenvalue Ratio  Critical Value Critical Value No. of CE(s) 
 
 0.096651  9.638690  19.96    24.60      None 
 0.031710  2.320127   9.24    12.97      At most 1 
 
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level     






Sample: 1979:1 1997:4       
Included observations: 74     
Test assumption: No deterministic trend in the data     
Series: INFLATION DEVALUATION      
Lags interval: 1 to 2, 3 to 4, 5 to 6     
 
Likelihood 5 Percent  1 Percent  Hypothesized 
Eigenvalue Ratio  Critical Value Critical Value No. of CE(s) 
 
 0.194188  22.36754  19.96    24.60         None * 
 0.082736  6.390604   9.24    12.97      At most 1 
 
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level     
L.R. test indicates 1 cointegrating equation(s) at 5% significance level     
  
TABLE 9   VOTE FOR THE INCUMBENT, INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
 
 
LS // Dependent Variable is VOTINCUMB     
Date: 07/02/98   Time: 12:27     
Sample: 1 9     
Included observations: 9     
 
Variable     Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
INFLATION    -0.005573   0.001872  -2.976666   0.0409 
UNEMPLOYMENT  -0.586350   0.463660  -1.264611   0.2747 
C       46.04942   4.724196   9.747567   0.0006 
DUM1        9.242833  4.140635   2.232226   0.0894 
DUM3     -10.25139   5.941378  -1.725423   0.1595 
 
R-squared     0.692087      Mean dependent var  39.93333 
Adjusted R-squared  0.384174      S.D. dependent var   4.800781 
S.E. of regression    3.767392      Akaike info criterion  2.952947 
Sum squared resid   56.77297      Schwarz criterion    3.062516 
Log likelihood   -21.05871      F-statistic     2.247672 
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CHART 14 B
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Chart 22 Elections and Unemployment